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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Respondent, 
vs. \ 
AUGUST SCHREIBER, ~ 
Defendant and Appellant. } 
Case No. 
7737 
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO 
ADDITIONAL POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES SUBMITTED 
BY RESPONDENT 
The respondent submitted certain authorities in a 
supplement to its brief on the morning the case was argued 
before the court on appeal. At that time the Court granted 
appellant leave to file a reply to those additional authorities 
within ten days. 
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2 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent's additional authorities were submitted in 
support of its contention that the statute (Section 105-36-
17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended), pursuant to 
which the trial court made its October 20, 1949 order, was 
violative of Article Seven, Section 12 of the Utah Consti-
tution. The following facts and circumstances of record 
must be recalled for a proper consideration of the said 
contention. 
At the time the October 20, 1949 order was made and 
entered by the court the defendant and appellant was not a 
prisoner in the state penitentiary, but rather was on pro-
bation under a previous order of the court suspending sen-
tence; the defendant had been on probation for several 
months and had complied fully with the conditions of his 
probation. A favorable report was made by his probation 
officer. It is significant to note that the trial court did not 
base its order of June 9, 1951, upon the unconstitutionality 
of the statute, but affirmatively stated that it deemed the 
statute to be constitutional. No claim has been made at 
any time herein that the order suspending sentence and 
placing defendant on probation was invalid. No claim has 
been made that termination of probation and discharge of 
defendant was not found to be compatible with the public 
interest. 
It is appellant's position that respondent misconceives 
the nature of the order of October 20, 1949, and the statute 
pursuant to which the order was made. The statute and 
order do not transgress the pardoning power embraced 
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within the constitutional provision. Both the statute and 
the order pertain to the exercise of an inherent judicial func-
~ tion, the power of a court to suspend sentence and place 
a defendant on probation, to designate the period of proba-
tion and to subsequently terminate the probation and dis-
charge the defendant where the conditions of the proba-
tion have been fulfilled and where such action be compatible 
with the public interest. There is a vital distinction which 
must be drawn between the power to pardon on one hand 
and the power to suspend sentence and place a defendant 
on probation and subsequently terminate the probation and 
discharge the defendant on the other hand. This distinc-
tion was recognized by courts long before either the Fed-
eral Constitution or the Constitution of the State of Utah 
was adopted and was unquestionably recognized by the 
framers of said constitutions. 
15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Section 481. 
The great weight of authority is to the effect that a 
statute authorizing a court to suspend sentence for reasons 
compatible with the public interest and to place a defendant 
on probation, controlling in its discretion the period of 
probation, does not do violence to constitutional provisions 
vesting the pardoning power in the executive department of 
the government. 
Annotation, 26 A. L. R. 400, 
Annotation, 101 A. L. R. 1402. 
The statute, pursuant to which the October 20, 1949 
order was made, must be read and studied as a whole to 
appreciate its purpose and effect. This statute does nothing 
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4 
more nor less than to confer upon the courts the power to 
suspend sentence, place a defendant on probation and to 
subsequently terminate the probation and discharge the 
defendant and dismiss the action when the probation require-
ments have been satisfied. The statute does not give the 
courts an independent power to dismiss an action after a 
defendant has been committed to the state penitentiary and 
has commenced to serve the term of his sentence ; nor was 
the order of October 20, 1949, made and entered upon such 
circumstances. The defendant had been placed on proba-
tion; good reason was shown to the court why the period 
of probation should be shortened and, pursuant to that, the 
court, by its order, discharged defendant from the further 
supervision of the parole department and dismissed the 
action. 
Certainly, if a court has the power to suspend sentence 
and place a defendant on probation for a period determined 
in its good discretion, the court has the incidental power to 
discharge a defendant and dismiss the action and close the 
case by an order of dismissal when finally the court deems 
that the probation requirements have been satisfied. The 
essential question is, therefore, whether the power which the 
statute gives to the courts to suspend sentence and place 
a defendant on probation for a period determined by the 
court is constitutional; the power to ultimately conclude 
the matter by an order of discharge and dismissal is in-
cidental to that. 
The said Utah statute was originally enacted in the 
Laws of 1923, page 144, section 1. Prior to that time there 
was some doubt as to the power of a court to indefinitely 
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5 
suspend sentence. In re FUnt, 25 Utah 338, 71 Pac. 531. 
Since the enactment of the said statute this Court has had 
frequent occasion to consider it. State v. Z olantakis, 70 
Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044; Ex Parte Follett, ... Utah ... , 
225 P. (2d) 16; Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P. 
(2d) ·640. In the above mentioned cases this Court con-
sidered at length the provisions of the Utah statute relating 
to the power of the courts to suspend sentence and place 
a defendant on probation. In none of those cases has the 
Court questioned the constitutionality of the statute. Im-
pliedly at least, the Court has held in those cases that the 
said provisions are constitutional. 
Appellant submits, therefore, that the order of October 
20, 1949, was simply an incidental part of the power given 
to the court by the statute to suspend sentence and place 
the defendant on probation for a period determined in the 
discretion of the court. If the provision in the statute pro-
viding for the ultimate disposition of a probation is invalid, 
· - the whole statute is invalid. However, appellant submits 
- that the statute is constitutional, because it vests in the 
courts a power which is inherently judicial, the power to 
suspend sentence, place on probation and ultimately termin-
ate the probation and discharge the defendant where in the 
court's discretion the probation conditions have been ful-
filled and the action is compatible with the public interest. 
It seems hardly necessary to say that the power em-
braced in the statute is one which is widely and frequently 
exercised by both State courts and Federal courts. It has as 
its purpose the reformation of convicted persons without 
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6 
the detriment of imprisonment. Few, if any, authorities on 
criminal rehabilitation and reform would question its wis-
dom. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT MACFARLANE, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
LEONARD J. LEWIS, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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